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abstract
Europeanization implies that policies are to be shaped by considerations which go beyond the formal sovereignty 
of EU’s member states. Claims for autonomy within the EU have been put forward not only by ‘stateless’ 
nations within plural and compound states, but also by regions demanding self-government. More often than not, 
meso-governments do not need par force the rationalising intervention of state central bureaucracies and elites. 
Autonomous regions enjoy additional economic and political security offered by the European Union and are 
gradually accommodated in a post-sovereignty era of progressive trans-nationalization. 
The paper elaborates on the idea of multi-level citizenship as a ‘civility compound’ of collective attachments 
which favours regional territorial autonomy. Multiple identities expressed by Europeans are inserted in a variable 
continuum of territorial belongings and affinities grounded in values of human rights and solidarity. Both civil and 
political rights are being increasingly accomplished at the regional level of EU’s member states. The exercise of 
civil and political rights has ‘spilt over’ into social citizenship. Attention is paid to the aspirations of regions and 
sub-state layers of governance to carry out welfare expansion based upon arguments of optimality, accountability, 
legitimacy, partnership and recalibration.
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1. introduction: transnationalization and subsidiarization 
Welfare states in the post-WWII period have often deployed a centralized mode of policy-
making, which has tended to make equality and homogenization synonymous notions. 
According to this view, citizens’ social entitlements ought to be provided in a unitary --and 
generally centralized-- administration of public services. In recent times, the centrality of the 
nation-state as the champion for the development of the modern systems of social protection 
has given way to a situation where both the supra-state and the sub-state welfare inputs are 
increasingly important in welfare development. 
Transnationalization has brought about the gradual decline of the role of the nation state 
as “sovereign” actor in social policy-making. In parallel, sub-state political communities 
have reinforced their claims for subsidiarization in welfare provision. Both processes of 
transnationalization and subsidiarization have questioned the centralized “command-and-
control” action of nation-states by putting forward the idea of territorially differentiated 
packages of public and social policies. 
Both processes of continental integration --such as Europeanization-- and decentralization of 
powers imply that policies are to be shaped by considerations beyond the national interests of 
the single states. Arguably, an era of national centralization has been followed by a period of 
decentralization in the advanced democracies of welfare capitalism (Marks et al 2008).1 In this 
chapter, references to the situation in the European Union illustrate such processes under way.
The consolidation of Marshall’s third cycle of social citizenship2 was meant to be achieved 
in the fourth phase of the system-building of Europe.3 This is in the process of institutional 
structuring and territorial adjustment within multi-layered EU (Bartolini 2005). In fact, the 
unfolding of structures of governance at a supranational European level is taking place through 
multilevel interactions. These interactions have mainly affected actors, regulatory powers and 
policy networks whose operations were traditionally confined to the national state arenas. More 
than half of the legislation affecting Europeans’ lives is already EU’s. As a political framework, 
the European Union is a compound of policy processes, which conditions in no little measure 
the formal sovereignty of the member states (Piattoni 2010). 
However, the state formation of the United States of Europe cannot be envisaged as the necessary 
end-result of Europeanization. The neo-functionalist school of thought has generally adopted the 
view that universal progress requires integration, which is made equal to cultural assimilation 
and to over-reaching identity formation, along the lines of the American “melting-pot”, or the 
multicultural “salad bowl”. Alternatively, the establishment of common European rules may be 
regarded as the result of accommodating the long-standing history and cultural diversity within 
the mosaic of peoples in the Old Continent. In this respect, multilevel citizenship is a key notion 
to be fully internalized by Europeans (Berg 2007). 
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Claims for the territorial subsidiarization of public policies have been put forward not only by 
stateless nations within plural and compound states, but also by regions and municipalities. Meso-
governments and local authorities often feel that they do not need par force the rationalizing 
intervention of central bureaucracies and elites in the exercise of their autonomy and political 
initiatives. Additionally, sub-state political communities enjoy economic and political security 
offered by the supra-national, such as the European Union, in a post-sovereignty era of 
progressive transnationalization (Keating 2001; Moreno and McEwen 2005).
Subsidiarization provides for decisions to be taken supra-nationally only if local, regional 
or national levels cannot perform better. In other words, the preferred locus for decision-
making is as decentralized and closer to the citizen as possible.4 Political elites of the member 
states, reluctant to further the process of transnationalization, have stubbornly interpreted the 
subsidiarity principle as a safeguard for the preservation of their power to intervene centrally 
within their state arenas. They have insisted in placing the bottom-line of subsidiarity at the 
level of the member-state, no further below.5 
This chapter elaborates on the idea of multilevel citizenship as a compound of collective 
attachments which favors supra-national legitimacy and sub-state democratic accountability 
in the implementation of social policies. The main focus of analysis is on the latter process. 
Likewise, attention is paid on the aspirations of regions and sub-state layers of governance to 
advance social citizenship. In the following section a brief conceptual review is carried out 
concerning the various citizens’ attachments in multilevel and transnational institutional settings. 
Subsequently, the impact of the so-called “new social risks” (NSR) are analyzed pondering sub-
state possibilities of welfare development and the advancement of social citizenship. To meet 
such aspirations, financial autonomy is discussed in the following section as a key resource for 
policy innovation together with the concomitants issues of redistribution and solidarity. The 
concluding section of the paper puts forward the idea that the advancement of social citizenship 
in Europe may be best achieved if the virtuous circle of emulation is encouraged among and 
within member states (policy learning and transfer, “soft” regulation, “benchmarking”, or “best 
practices”).
2. citizens’ identities, coMpound civility and social policy
More often than not, the concepts of state and nation have been made synonymous by modernity. 
At the end of the twentieth century, however, they were congruent only in dozen of nation 
states (Hobsbawm 1996). Multinational states are generally composed of various political 
communities. The latter are to be understood as groups constituted by all the individuals ruled 
and represented by the structures of a political system, whether national or regional (Easton 
1965). In a situation of multilevel governance, political communities can exist from the local 
to the supra-national level, disregarding the formal requirements of sovereignty (Hooghe and 
Marks 2001; Loughlin 2007). 
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Fostering identification by the nation-state among their subjects has continued to be regarded 
as the conditio sine que non for the establishment of citizenship status. At the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, exclusive national state identities are, nonetheless, openly questioned and 
have become problematic. While being corroded by the forces of globalization they are also 
subject to fragmentation, competition and overlapping elements of a multiple and diverse nature, 
particularly in polities of a multiple and plural composition. In some instances, as is the case of 
the EU, citizenship of the Union is meant to complement and to not replace national citizenship. 
As a result, there is a noticeable strengthening of sub- and supra-state identities (Moreno 1999). 
Already in the 1990s, little more that a third of the surveyed population (World Survey Values) 
considered the nation-state identity as most important, while one in two respondents thought it 
was the local or regional (Norris 2000).
Autonomy, devolution or federalization seek to accommodate a response to the stimuli of the 
diversity or plurality of the polities involved. These may comprise regional political communities 
with differences of identity, history, language or traditions, which are often reflected in different 
party systems, channels of elites’ representation or interests’ articulation. Since the mid-1980s, 
a great deal of survey evidence on the “Moreno question” has shown congruence in various 
degrees and manners between identity attachments to both state and sub-state levels. Dual 
and multiple identities reflect those processes by which citizens express shared loyalties and 
political aspirations through the various level of adscription. The emphasis on territorial identities 
and polities showing a significant degree of internal diversity ought not to be placed merely on 
distinctiveness, but also on those relationships of democracy, interaction and cooperation (Linz 
1997; Gagnon and Tully 2001; Moreno 2005).
In the case of the European Union, citizenship can be seen as being the product of nested 
identities formed at the various contextual levels of citizens’ political attachments (supra-state, 
state, sub-state) (Faist 2001; Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2003; Bruter 2005). Those multiple 
identities expressed by Europeans are inserted in a variable continuum of territorial belongings 
and affinities grounded in values of human rights and solidarity. Both civil and political rights 
are being increasingly accomplished at the regional level of EU’s member states. As it could no 
be otherwise, the exercise of civil and political rights has “spilt over” into social citizenship at 
the regional level (Jeffery 2009)
Accordingly, Europeans’ civic culture can be conceptualized as one of compound civility,6 in 
which policy provision is in tune with welfare institutional arrangements of a diverse functional 
and territorial nature. Compound civility may incorporate not only multiple memberships to 
European nations (state or stateless) and regions, but it also integrates a common baseline 
--mixed and cross-bred in many instances-- which conforms the axiology of the European Social 
Model. The ESM appears as a common value-system, which makes solidarity possible and 
legitimizes the re-distribution of resources and vital opportunities characteristic of European 
welfare systems.7 
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During the twentieth century the welfare state -- a European “invention”-- embodied 
institutionally the values of equality and compassion in the Old Continent. However, the 
question on whether social justice and solidarity are possible beyond the nation state remains 
open. It is argued that local identities and group cultures may act as restraints to the solidarity 
of the national welfare states. To these allegations others views --also formulated from the 
democratic theory-- counterargument that collective identity continues to be a pre-condition for 
legitimizing advanced industrial societies (Dahl 1989; Held 1991; Giner 1994; Archibugi et al. 
1998).
The development of a European supra-national welfare state --and its corollary of top-down 
social policies-- is unlikely in the near future. All national, regional and local levels will 
combine their inputs in peoples’ expectations, perceptions and attitudes. Already, capitalist 
forces are aware of the possibilities of rescaling territorially their activities in order to maximize 
investments. These processes of rescaling and “unbundling of territoriality” will have a direct 
impact on citizens’ living standards in their localities and regions of residence (Somerville 
2004; Moreno 2007; Ferrera 2008). 
For social research it is not easy to assess when the level of citizens’ well-being is “unsatisfactory” 
in a region or local political community unable to self-management and self-regulation. In such 
situations the inputs of national and transnational actors and institutions may be crucial for the 
maintenance of minimum standards of living conditions, although such interventions can also 
perpetuate vertical clientelism, “race to the bottom” practices and, in sum, political anomie.
Indeed, social policy-making is highly shaped by local cultures and life styles, and is less likely 
to be dealt with in a homogenous and centralized manner from a supra-national entity (Moreno 
2003; Ferrera 2005). In recent decades, regions have come not only to re-assert their political 
identities by means implementing policies for welfare development. They have been effective 
in advancing social citizenship, particularly in those areas of labor activation, social assistance, 
care services and the policy closure of safety nets of welfare protection (Fargion 2000; Arriba 
and Moreno 2005, 2010; Kazepov 2008). Such a course of action runs hand in hand with a 
growing implication of the Third Sector and NGOs, the for-profit welfare provision of policies 
and services to the general public, and corporate welfare. All these developments, together with 
the “residual” regulatory role carried out by governments, have coalesced into a welfare mix 
which postulates itself as an aggregate of preferences to conciliate ideological differences and 
to optimize sustainable economic development and social cohesion. The emergence of “new 
social risks” (NSR) is to put to test the collaborative capacity of all these actors in optimizing 
the welfare mix. The focus of the next section is on sub-state regional welfare.
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3. new social risks and regional welfare
During most of the twentieth century the institutionalization of welfare aimed at advancing 
social rights within the context of the evolution of citizenship in industrial democracies. At the 
turn of the millennium, social citizenship in Europe has remained as a legitimate goal in “post-
industrial” democracies, despite that both welfare producers and consumers have had to adapt 
their roles and functions to the changing scenarios brought about by the new global order. 
Structural modifications are taken place in advanced democracies following the emergence of 
“new social risks”. NSR are associated with the transition to a post-industrial (post-Fordist) 
society, and include four main elements: (1) higher participation of women in the formal labor 
market; (2) an increase in the numbers of frail and dependent elderly people; (3) the rise of 
social exclusion for workers with poor education; and (4) the expansion of “irresponsible” 
private services and the de-regulation of their public counterparts (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002; 
Taylor-Gooby 2004).
As a consequence of NSR, vulnerable groups are likely to experience new needs in four broad 
areas: (i) balancing paid work and family responsibilities (especially child-care), (ii) being 
called on for care for a frail elderly relative, or becoming frail and lacking family support; 
(iii) lacking the skills necessary to gain access to an adequately paid and secure job, or having 
skills and training that become obsolete and being unable to upgrade them through life-long 
learning; and (iv) using private provision that supplies an insecure or inadequate pension or 
unsatisfactory services (Bonoli 2005; Armingeon and Bonoli, 2007).
Growth beyond limits and the crowding out effects of public welfare covering “old social 
risks” (illiteracy, old-age, sickness or unemployment) have encouraged regions to explore 
new policies for dealing with NSR. Some state-centric advocates of “orthodox” neo-classical 
recipes had insisted in the last decades on the irreversibility of welfare retrenchment. For 
them, an explosion of welfare demands had provoked an implosion of decisions by central 
governments, which had to face increasing political constraints. From a Marxian perspective, 
both processes of legitimization of the capitalist system and the erosion of the mechanisms 
of capitalist accumulation were at a point of saturation.8 In recent times, however, it is more 
accurate to refer to the cost containment deployed by European central treasuries rather than the 
actual reduction of welfare benefits and programs.9 Indeed, social protection has been preserved 
in the highly legitimized social insurance or tax-funded welfare states (Kuhnle 2000; Pierson 
2001; Taylor-Gooby 2001). 
NSR induce new welfare re-arrangements. They also put the questions on how to articulate 
the welfare mix in contexts of multilevel citizenship and on their combination with old “core” 
welfare commitments. In this prevailing scenario the role of transnational institutions and the 
initiatives of the regional, or meso-governments, are gaining political relevance. The latter 
can proceed with a moderate welfare expansion regarding NSR, which could make up for the 
advancement of social citizenship. Several regions in EU’s member states have been active in 
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policy innovation particularly as concerns welfare assistance and the “closure” of safety nets 
of social protection. As an illustration of these developments the cases of Basque Country’s 
Regional Plan against Poverty or Scotland’s Free Care for the Elderly stand out as cases in 
point. 
Let us remind that in the late 1980s, the Basque regional government introduced a Poverty 
Plan establishing a minimum income guaranteed for the needy who did not qualify for other 
basic benefits available within the Spanish safety net of social protection. This regional 
initiative sparked of a “demonstration effect” in the period 1989-1995, during which all 17 
Spain’s Comunidades Autónomas implemented programs of minimum income guaranteed. Up 
until now, emulation and imitation among the Comunidades Autónomas have proved to be 
an effective barrier against open discrimination amongst them, and a very effective de facto 
equalizer of policy output (Arriba and Moreno, 2005). 
In post-devolution Scotland, the Scottish Executive implemented in 2002 an ex novo policy of 
free personal and nursing care for the elderly. The total cost of the Grant Aided Expenditure 
amounted to around 1,000 million Pounds Sterling in 2006. Lord Sutherland, who chaired the 
Royal Commission on the Long Term Care of the Elderly in 1999, reported in 2008 that the 
policy had a universal acceptance (NB. The program was implemented in 2002 by a Labour/
Liberal Democrat Scottish Executive and has been actively supported by the subsequent 
nationalist SNP Government). Some 50,000 older people in Scotland are benefiting from the 
policy. Unlike the case of the Basque Country, neither England-Wales nor Northern Ireland10 
has followed the pattern of “imitation”. This has been mainly due to considerations about the 
financial “sustainability” that such a policy would have for central UK’s central government 
(Sutherland, 2008). 
Further research is needed in order not only to systematize the scarce information available 
on the regional input of EU’s welfare states, but to assess the effects of policy innovation 
and learning induced by the European meso-level. Such research program ought to clarify 
the alleged limited capacity --such as limitations of size-- that regions have when confronting 
welfare development on their own. 
Certain caveats have been voiced on the limited capacity --such as limitations of size-- that 
regions have when confronting welfare development on their own. Among these, the “race-
to-the-bottom” argument claims that globalization inevitably leads to a reduction of citizens’ 
rights. Certainly, social and environmental standards, particularly in less developed countries, 
can be highly shaped by foreign direct investments decisions taken by company boards of 
the basis of short-term interests, or in the expectations of immediate returns disregarding the 
medium- and long-term needs of the hosting region. This might induce local, regional and 
national governments to offer incentives of lower salaries and social welfare. But there are 
also cases where the opposite happens. Both politicians and decision-makers at state and sub-
state levels may become “credit-claimers” depending upon their situational logic and political 
strategies. Many of the latter have proved to be successful as relatively better-off regions in 
luis Moreno
- 9 -
the European context have managed to maximize their higher degrees of human and relational 
capitals (Berry et al. 2003; Moreno and McEwen 2005).
In several instances, regional loci of decision-making have proved to be effective “layers of 
accountability” (Goodin 2003). They have also experienced that the payoff for innovation 
has exceeded past advantages of having central elites deciding on regional policies and the 
allocation of public moneys. It so often happens that when the need for innovation --on sorting 
out a “new problem” or finding a solution-- is more pressing, it is also higher the desirability 
for having “laboratories of democracy” where sub-state government and actors promote policy 
innovation (Donahue 1997). Among the various preferences for regions to take responsibility 
on the implementation of social policy-making the following criteria can be briefly enumerated:
Accountability, which favors democratic participation and citizens’ involvement in public 
life by means, for instance, of regional and local policy networks and advocacy coalitions. 
Such actors, or groups of actors, not only fulfill the criteria of proximity but can also optimize 
resources from local communities based upon a better “tuning” with their needs. Also important 
are the integration of the processes of learning in articulating citizens’ demands and monitoring 
policy outcomes.
Legitimacy, which is supported by EU’s “umbrella” commitment to financing less-developed 
regions by means of regional funds. At European level the assumption of solidarity with the 
poorer regions --and hence with their precarious citizens-- is fully legitimized since 1975, with 
the establishment of structural funds aimed at balancing out the uneven development of the 
European regions. Cohesion funds are also designed to reduce internal economic and social 
disparities. 
Optimality, which is based mostly on considerations of size and economies of scale and that 
are regarded suitable for certain social policies (e.g. personal care services). Surveys have 
consistently found that a majority of citizens prefer to be cared of in their own places of 
residence and, if possible, by family relatives or fellow residents. Such preferences are often a 
priority when the full social costs are considered in the delivery of social services by regional 
and local institutions. 
Partnership, which is articulated as a result of the growing interdependence between public 
and private resources within the welfare mix. Social partnership is to involve and maximize 
consultation, negotiation and information exchange on issues of welfare development such 
as public-private promotion of social rights (e.g. corporate welfare arrangements on working 
hours for the conciliation of employees’ work and family).
Recalibration. Regions with a perspective of cosmopolitan localism11 may opt-out of the 
traditional guidance and political co-option of central state elites. Such perspective is reflected 
in both societal interests, which are aimed at developing a sense of local community and at 
participating simultaneously in the international context. There is, thus, a growing adjustment 
between the particular and the general, or between transnationalization and subsidiarization. 
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The recasting of the boundaries of the national welfare states opens new opportunities to EU’s 
and regions’ inputs in the establishment of new welfare policy instruments.
Normative views against decentralization, in general, and welfare subsidiarization, in particular, 
refer to the possible exacerbation of inequalities and territorial disparities. This has often been 
the case in those nation-states where regional policies deployed by central governments and 
elites have structurally “frozen” --if not augmented-- previous existing differences. This mode 
of articulation of regional interests --not accountable democratically to regional institutions-- 
has often impeded policy innovation and mobilization and has been responsible for the 
encroachment of inefficient central policy provision. 
Social insurance entitlements on “old risks” will remain in the foreseeable future as a state-wide 
responsibility and will be financed by national “pools” of taxes or contributions. However, the 
covering of NSR could well be paid off by “new” moneys raised at local and regional level. For 
such purposes, arrangements allowing for greater fiscal autonomy by sub-state levels are of the 
foremost importance. Regions enjoying a higher degree of fiscal autonomy may provide with 
fresh resources for the advancement of social citizenship. In this following section a review 
on the politics of territorial redistribution, decentralization and solidarity serves the purpose 
of highlighting the possibilities that sub-state political communities may have in social policy-
making. 
4. autonoMy, solidarity and territorial redistribution
The emotional force of nationhood, and the solidarity and mutual belonging it engenders, serve 
political purposes. The idea that the nation-state represents a people sharing a common identity 
and a set of civic values has traditionally; (a) enhanced its legitimacy; (b) aimed at fostering 
citizens’ participation in the democratic process; and (c) underpinned much of the discourse 
used to justify public policy-making and governmental action. Just as appeals to a sense of 
statehood have been made to provide moral justification for military action, a shared nation-
state identity has also been drawn upon to justify state intervention in domestic spheres. For 
example, increases (or decreases) in redistributive taxation, or legislation concerning social 
or moral issues, may be justified in the name of the national community and the values it 
is deemed to espouse. The picture seems to become more complex when citizens’ manifest 
multiple identities and diverse territorial allegiances. But there is no intrinsic contradiction in 
legitimizing multilevel governance. Thus, different packages of social policy provision may 
respond to the demands of autonomy and solidarity in plural and transnational institutional 
settings. 
Redistribution of resources among citizens --inter-personal and inter-territorial-- has had 
both nation-state and income economic policies as the preferred context and instruments to 
achieve social cohesion in contemporary times. Most attempts during the twentieth century 
were geared to articulate an inclusive welfare state nurtured by social solidarity across class 
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boundaries and having the nation-state as “the” arena for social risk-pooling. Class identities 
and alliances forged across the nation-state territory were to generate feelings of bonding and 
inclusive membership. Political actors at the sub-state level have claimed that social solidarity 
may enjoy a high degree of legitimacy in smaller territories, where a strong sense of common 
identity and a mutual sense of belonging is shared, and where a transnational framework of non-
discriminatory constitutional provisions of an egalitarian nature is guaranteed (e.g. Scotland 
and the EU).12
Because it embodied feelings of solidarity and mutual obligation among members of a national 
community, a shared nation-state identity was to represent an essential pre-requisite to the 
functioning of redistributive welfare systems.13 In this line of argument, solidarity, redistribution 
and a unitary welfare state were to constitute a virtuous circle in the provision of social benefits 
entitlements. Countries with a unitary political culture, or where their constituent units perceived 
the benefits of such a top down implementation, welcomed and supported the construction of 
national welfare systems. The nation-state executives should take on redistribution while sub-
state administrations should be in charge of administrative functions. Nevertheless, no consistent 
empirical findings have lent support for a “positive sum” arrangement with the allocation of the 
function of redistribution to the national level and those concerning the operationalization of 
welfare policies to the regional level. 
After the period of the so-called treinte glorieuses, or Golden Age of welfare capitalism (1945-
1975), political developments began to put the aspirations of the internal territories of the 
state in the forefront of collective social demands. Coupled with (a) the progressive loss of 
legitimacy of a model of vertical state intervention, (b) the revival of ethnoterritorial identities 
and (c) the quest for sub-state territorial autonomy, the emergence on the NSR has provided sub-
state political communities with new “windows of opportunity” for political action and policy 
innovation. These initiatives have fought the centralized attempts to dismantle top-down the 
welfare state according to the neo-liberal creed of deregulation and “rolling back the frontiers 
of the state”. 
The debate on whether decentralization constrains redistribution is an unfinished one. There 
is a large cross-national literature which uses multivariate analysis to understand the factors 
that influence levels of social spending (Hicks and Swank, 1992; Huber and Stephens 2001). 
This literature has a long-standing trajectory (Cameron 1978), and has regularly concluded 
that federalism and/or decentralization constrains the expansion of the national welfare state. 
Further arguments point to the contention that rescaling can have more powerful negative 
effects than any other institutional variable; greater than factors such as the level of corporatism 
in decision-making, the nature of the electoral system or a presidential system of government 
(Swank 2002). However, federal countries with a long-standing record of welfare development, 
such as Australia or Canada, demonstrate a greater positive correlation between social spending 
and redistribution (Obinger et al. 2005), 
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In addition to the structure of the state, redistribution may also be affected by the state’s ethnic 
composition. It has been argued that the degree of redistribution is more limited in countries 
which are ethnically heterogeneous or that have high levels of immigration. Some have suggested 
that public policies designed to recognize and accommodate internal diversity are detrimental 
to the robustness of the welfare state, with numerous consequences. They may have: (i) a 
crowding-out effect, diverting energy, money and time from redistribution to recognition; (ii) 
a corroding effect, eroding trust and solidarity amongst citizens; or (iii) a misdiagnosis effect, 
with “culturalist” solutions shifting attention from the “real problem” of class inequalities. 
But the causal relationship between welfare retrenchment and policies of accommodation and 
recognition is not empirically sustained (Banting and Kymlicka 2006) 
For regions in decentralized countries the form of devolution is an important area of analysis 
in assessing social policy outcomes. Some findings point to the fact that countries in which 
responsibility for spending is decentralized, but responsibility for revenue-raising is centralized, 
tend to spend more than other countries, other things being equal. By contrast, in countries 
where both revenue-raising and welfare spending are decentralized, expenditure levels appear 
lower (Rodden 2003). 
Autonomy in public and social expenditure is viewed as “part-and-parcel” of political 
autonomy not only by richer regions and conurbations (e.g. Basque Country, Flanders, Quebec, 
or London), but also in poorer ones (e.g. Andalusia, Corsica, Scotland, or Berlin). Autonomy is 
also confronted with the principle of inter-territorial solidarity, which implies the redistribution 
and transfer of funds from the richer to the poorer regions within nation states, and between 
these in wider institutional contexts such as EU’s. The ultimate goal of equalization is that of 
attaining a minimal level of basic services, the procurement of citizenship rights and an adequate 
distribution of the financial burdens. Block grants are generally used by central treasuries 
in order to preserve a degree of inter-territorial redistribution. The debate on whether such 
transfers are to be categorical -- “earmarked”-- or not is crucial for the exercise of discretionary 
autonomy by the recipient regions.
Equalization systems seek to redistribute fairly the available general financial resources. 
Criticisms are usually voiced by wealthier regions when they feel that the equalization system 
is far too redistributive and lacks clear distributive criteria so as to motivate the subsidized and 
more deprived regions to improve their performance. The latter generally demand a higher level 
of public spending as to empower them for “catching-up” with the other political communities. 
But redistribution may also come in the form of central public investments in large infrastructure 
projects, which may be discretionary and may neglect or discriminate against some regions for 
“unconfessed” --covert-- party-political reasons (e.g. “unproductive” investments and personal 
transfers in Italy’s Mezzogiorno after WWII). These practices may have been “legitimized” by 
the high level of political support across regions enjoyed by state-wide welfare programs under 
the responsibility of central authorities such as old-age pensions, social security benefits or 
unemployment benefits.14
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Concerns over the “race to the bottom” or, conversely, of sub-state political communities 
becoming welfare “magnets”, have generally been overstated. While politicians may choose to 
believe that generous benefits will attract welfare beneficiaries from other territories, there is 
little evidence to support such claims. Even in a federal country such as the USA --where there 
is a much greater geographical mobility than in Europe-- there is little empirical evidence to 
suggest that “voting with their feet” actually takes place (Weissert and Weissert 2002). Given 
the importance of this logic on the normative defense of redistribution as a national state-level 
function, perhaps this long-standing view should be revisited. In fact, there is some evidence of 
a “race to the top” as devolved administrations aim to take on policies of nation/region-building 
showing their capabilities for innovation in welfare matters (e.g. Canadian provinces, German 
Länder, Italian Regioni, Spanish Comunidades Autónomas or UK’s devolved administrations) 
(Moreno & McEwen 2005).
Political decentralization in long-standing democracies may also shape the traditional outlook 
of the welfare state. Sub-state autonomy over welfare legislation can lead to policy divergence, 
and the development of distinctive welfare regimes within the boundaries of a single state. 
Some degree of policy divergence is an inevitable consequence of political decentralization, 
particularly where this has emerged in response to self-government demands. Policy divergence 
has the potential to undermine inter-regional solidarity only if it implies that citizens in different 
regions of the same state --or political community-- do not enjoy access to similar services, or 
do not have recognition of the same social rights and entitlements. Although control over social 
insurance has tended to rest with central government, sub-state political autonomy has involved 
the decentralization of substantial areas of the welfare state, particularly within the arena of 
personal social services, as examined above these lines. The subsidiarization of the welfare state 
can stimulate policy innovation, with a “demonstration effect” that minimizes the detrimental 
consequences for state-national solidarity. At the transnational level, the implicit assumption 
of solidarity in the policies of income redistribution carried out by continental integration has 
largely legitimized multilevel intervention. 
5. conclusion: eu’s regions as welfare developers
Regions can pursue policy innovation and welfare expansion while complying with national and 
European institutional frameworks of solidarity and redistribution. Due to the very nature of 
multilevel governance, there is little impediment to prevent regions from developing programs 
advancing social citizenship based upon two premises, as in the case of the EU:
(1) Post-regulatory EU embrace the idea that “soft regulation” serves better the purposes and 
dialectics of unity in diversity characteristic of the process of Europeanization and the necessary 
processes of policy learning. The Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) can be considered as a 
post-regulatory resource and as a new paradigm of social regulation.15 The OMC is not based on 
detailed rules but rather on the establishment of general “procedures” (procedural regulation) 
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which allow greater flexibility, variation and freedom. Promoting this mode of governance 
permits a response to the democratic legitimacy crisis faced by European institutions. This 
development is replacing a centralized perspective based on a formal model of subordination. 
The new mode of regulation seeks the involvement of a great number of actors in the decision-
making process, so that a wide range of political perspectives and social interests may come 
together.
(2) The practices of emulation fit much more appropriately with the conditions of EU’s internal 
variance as well as with subsidiarization (“benchmarking” and “best practices”). The latter are 
geared at the identification of indicators synchronically (among countries) and diachronically 
(through time) which would conform procedural regulation in line with preferences for flexibility, 
discretion and variation. The virtue circle of emulation may be the most suitable course of 
action, as it would avoid being realized as an exogenous process superimposed externally. The 
conciliation of the various identity layers and citizens’ political expectations ought to be a 
determining factor for the building of a European “community of trust.”
Encouragement for the nominal convergence of policy outcomes under the auspices of central 
EU’s institutions have been based upon the idea of a common European citizenship and socio-
economic model. The efforts made by less-developed and “late-comer” member states in order 
to “catch up” to median EU figures and indicators has allowed cohesion and credibility to the 
European project.16 Likewise, regions and sub-state political communities also confront the 
incentive to abandon their position as “laggards” according to their own aspirations for welfare 
expansion and the advancement of social citizenship. Desirable future scenarios should allow 
the unfolding of new synergies into a welfare mix of entitlements, interventions and policy 
instruments with long-term effects for the improvement of citizens’ living conditions. This is to 
be in line with the very nature of multilevel citizenship.1*
1 * This paper has been written during the research activities of the ESF project, ‘Welfare Attitudes in 
a Changing Europe’ and the CSIC-CNR project, ‘Social policy and multilevel governance’. I am grateful to 
comments and inputs to previous texts on these topics made by Michael Burgess, Kris Deschouwer, Valeria 
Fargion, Maurizio Ferrera, Alain Gagnon, Salvador Giner, Charlie Jeffery, Michael Keating, Guy Lachapelle, 
André Lecours, John Loughlin, Nicola McEwen, Bruno Palier, Simona Piattoni, William Safran and Peter 
Taylor-Gooby. Responsibility for analyses and interpretations remain solely with the author.
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notes
1 This comparative study of 42 democratic or semi-democratic countries has found that, in the period 
1950-2006, institutional reforms have taken place in the direction of greater regional authority by a ratio 
of 8 to 1.
2 This was viewed as the subsequent historical stage once political and civil citizenship had been realized 
(Marshall 1950; 1965). Marshall’s argument for social citizenship can be regarded as a dynamic account 
--rather than as an evolutionary theory-- of the struggle between the extension of political equality and 
social rights, on the one hand, and the capitalist market and social class, on the other hand (Breiner 
2006).
3 Stein Rokkan (1921-79) drew attention on the interrelations between internal structuring and 
external boundary-building for understanding the connections between state formation (military an 
administrative), nation-building (cultural), and the development of mass democracies (political) (Flora 
et al. 1999). Welfare development is the latter stage in Rokkan’s attempt to put forward a typological-
topological map of Europe.
4 The principle of subsidiarity enshrined in the Treaty of European Union of 1992 (Maastricht Treaty) 
contains two diverse definitions on subsidiarity. The first one is of a substantial nature and is included in 
the Preamble and Art. 1 and expresses a broad political and conceptual understanding concerning both 
criteria of proximity and proportionality. The second definition put forward in Art.5 (originally 3b) is 
of a procedural character and its legal implementation has been rather problematic (van Hecke 2003).
5 Debates in the EU on the so-called “subsidiarity watchdog” are illustrative of the difficulties in 
conciliating national and regional interests. Both layers of governments (national and regional) have 
been engaged in a dispute as whether an additional referral procedure before the entry into force of a 
European legislative measure --which would conflict with the powers vested on each tier of government-- 
was to be introduced. This referral procedure would establish that the application of a piece of European 
legislation would be suspended, and eventually put before the European Court for decision on ultra vires 
principles, if a qualified minority of member states or a significant minority of the “partner regions” 
(regions with concerned legislative powers) were to contest it. Such measures of constitutional design 
would be of the outmost importance in the re-structuring of welfare arrangements (Moreno and Palier 
2005).
6 Civility may be co-related not only with citizenship but also with the idea of patriotism. In a loose 
meaning, patriotism appeals to a collective attachment to the institutions and values of a polity in a 
manner similar to that of affinity among family members. The additament constitutional is usually 
added but is often confused with the ideology of (state or majority) nationalism. The patriot can be loyal 
to his/her own country’s language, history and culture. However, such a country may be integrated into a 
larger political community (e.g. Scotland and the United Kingdom) (Moreno 2006).
7 And which contrasts with other models (USA’s) on the application of values for motivational goals 
such as fiscal progressivity. Unlike in the Old Continent, nearly a majority of surveyed people in the US 
declares that rich and poor should pay the same percentage of taxes on income (flat-rate) (Lewis-Beck 
et al. 2008).
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8 The “O’Goffe’s tale” makes reference to the theses of O’Connor (1973), Gough (1979) and Offe (1984) 
that there is an insuperable contradiction for the maintenance of the expansive and solidaristic welfare 
state.
9 In fact, European welfare states are in a process of convergence towards the middle concerning, 
among other indicators, income inequality, public expenditure and social protection expenditure. Gini 
coefficients and the risk of poverty have been reduced slightly, while expenditures have risen in absolute 
terms (Adelantado and Calderón 2006).
10 Despite that the Northern Irish Government had voted to provide free personal care for the elderly in 
Northern Ireland from 2008 onwards, the Northern Irish Health Minister had stated that the date in the 
Bill for the implementation of the program was not binding and that it would more likely to happen in 
2010/11. In England and Wales neither Labour nor Conservatives were in favor of free long-term care 
for the elderly along the lines of the Scottish scheme.
11 Cosmopolitan localism mainly concerns medium-sized polities, within or without the framework of a 
state. In the Old Continent it can be detected not only in small nation-states (Denmark, Eire, Luxembourg) 
and stateless minority nations (Catalonia, Flanders, Scotland), but also in regions (Brussels, Languedoc, 
Lombardy) and conurbations (Berlin, London, Madrid) (Moreno 2005).
12 In the 1990s the percentage of Scots of different social classes feeling more in common with fellow 
Scots than with English of the same class was markedly on the rise. The 1999 Scottish Parliamentary 
Election Survey found that a majority of Scots identified with opposite-class Scots among both people 
who called themselves working class (71% of the total population in Scotland), and among people who 
called themselves middles class (Paterson et al. 2001).
13 David Miller (1995, 2000) has combated the idea of recognizing minority identities without linking 
them to an overarching national identification. Likewise, Margaret Canovan (1996) has argued that the 
sense of communal solidarity inherent in national identity explains why goods and possessions should 
be regarded as shared and defines the boundaries within which they should be redistributed. Processes of 
“boundary-bonding” have developed nationally in the solidarity models of welfare capitalism (Ferrera 
2005).
14 In Flanders, regionalists have in recent times requested the splitting of the national social security 
system based upon a majority of Flemish citizens in favor of such division. The “improbable” reform 
should require a wide consensus between the two communities (French-speaking and Flemish-speaking) 
in order to change the constitution (Dandoy and Baudewyns 2005).
15 This method consists of the following stages: (a) The European institutions propose a series of 
guidelines, composed of measures and general objectives, often grouped under concepts like, for 
instance, “activation” or “employability”; (b) These guidelines are transposed into national and regional 
policy by the member states (National Reform Programs); (c) A benchmarking system is set up for 
comparison between countries and over time of the evolution of the member states and to identify best 
practices; and (d) A process of evaluation, review and monitoring on the part of the peer group and the 
European institutions is generated.
16 Spain’s “catching up” with the median figures of the EU 15 is very illustrative: 70% at the time of its 
accession in 1986 and 94% in 2008 (increase in per capita income measured in purchasing power parity 
PPP, as percentage of European mean) In 2008, the corresponding figure for EU-27 was 102.6%.
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